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DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY

Dan, Garthoff
as promised
Bill

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December 4, 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S *[initials]*

FROM: G - Ambassador L. E. Thompson *[initials]*

SUBJECT: Review of Non-Proliferation Policy

I want to call your attention to the "Summary of Action" issued by ACDA following the last meeting of the Committee of Principals. This paper (Tab A) refers to agreement that Mr. Foster establish a small inter-Governmental group (I assume inter-agency was meant) "to investigate the desirability of a non-proliferation policy."

The ACDA paper also states that the investigation should be coordinated with the activities of the Gilpatric Committee. Ray Garthoff, who is working with the Gilpatric Committee, informs me that its plan of work does not in fact cover the kind of review which you have sought. An "issues" working paper of the Gilpatric Committee does include specific reference to this problem, but Gilpatric has orally informed his Committee that this is a question raised by the Department of State and not shared by ACDA and other Agencies, and they await further indication from the Department of specific propositions that the Committee might consider. Attached (Tab B) is the NSAM outlining the mission of the Gilpatric Committee, and noting specifically that the government agencies should continue their work in this field.

In response to a request from me, John McNaughton has had prepared a preliminary staff study on the possibilities of providing nuclear weapons under US custody earmarked for use by indigenous Asian military forces. This study is attached (Tab C). I want to stress that this is a preliminary staff study, and has not been examined by the JCS or cleared by Secretary McNamara; it has been informally transmitted to me by McNaughton.

Unfortunately, the DOD staff study is not directly responsive to what you wanted; it examines possible bilateral nuclear support of the kind we provide to NATO Allies, rather than a regional stockpile "bank" on which threatened countries could draw. It does indicate the feasibility of providing nuclear capable weapons systems under currently programmed MAP, appropriate training, and nuclear storage facilities for Japan, India,

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- 2 -

Pakistan, Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, Korea, Republic of China, and Thailand. There would, of course, be many politico-military considerations requiring careful further study in determining which, if any, of these countries we might wish to provide with nuclear weapons. While the study does not include consideration of a "bank" of nuclear weapons from which such countries could draw, it does indicate that if the political "management" of such a bank could be arranged it would be feasible to have nuclear capable weapons and trained forces ready to receive nuclear warheads that could be rapidly flown in to prepared sites. Should my committee continue to work on this problem, or should we make arrangements to turn over further work to the new committee being established by Bill Foster?

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That I turn over further work on possible nuclear stockpile banking arrangements to the new Foster committee.

Agree DK Disagree _____

2. That you decide whether you wish the Gilpatric Committee to consider possible exceptions to our policy of discouraging nuclear proliferation.

If so, do you wish to assign responsibility for raising this subject with them:

- (a) To the new Foster Committee

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

- (b) To my office

Approve DK Disapprove _____

Attachments:

1. Tab A - Committee of Principals-Summary of Action-Nov. 2
2. Tab B - NSAM 320
3. Tab C - DOD/ISA preliminary uncleared staff study.

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Washington, D. C.

MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE OF PRINCIPALS

Monday, November 23, 1964 - 4:30 P.M.
Secretary of State's Conference Room

SUMMARY OF ACTION

NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS - COURSE OF ACTION
FOR UNGA

Reference: Memorandum for the Members of the Committee of Principals, dated November 12, 1964, from William C. Foster, Director, ACDA, Subject: Attached paper on "Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" - Course of Action for UNGA.

1. After considerable discussion of the basic U.S. policy on non-proliferation, it was agreed that Mr. Foster would establish a small inter-Governmental group to investigate the desirability of a non-proliferation policy, particularly in light of the newly acquired Chinese capability. The study, however, would not be limited to the China problem but would also consider the implications of this policy in other areas. This investigation should be coordinated with

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-2-

the activities of the Gilpatric Committee and aim to prepare a policy paper by early January. It is essential that this group work on a completely secret basis even as to its existence. It is clear that present Government policy is against proliferation but this study is merely designed to look at the alternative possibilities.

2. It was agreed that the proposed draft resolution for the General Assembly be modified in the following ways:

a. Paragraph 2 should include a reference to a requirement for safeguards in international agreements to be concluded.

b. Paragraph 3 should be changed to substitute "Governments and authorities" for "states."

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U.S. NUCLEAR ASSISTANCE TO PACIFIC - ASIAN COUNTRIES

1. PROBLEM: To examine possible courses of action designed to discourage possible interest of selected Pacific-Asian countries in developing independent nuclear capabilities, by permitting them some nuclear roles.

2. FACTORS CONSIDERED:

a. The primary elements relating to this problem concern:

(1) the desire to remain consistent with the non-proliferation policy;

(2) the need to show an active counter to the effect of anticipated additional events in CHICOM nuclear weapons development;

(3) the use of forces currently possessed by or programmed for friendly countries which are or could be capable of delivering U.S. nuclear weapons;

(4) the problem of developing adequate formulas for U.S. storage, control and delivery of nuclear weapons to foreign nations;

(5) the limitation of missions considered to those within the scope of U.S. commitments and objectives which weapons potentially delivered by friendly forces could accomplish;

(6) the necessity to develop a program to achieve U.S. objectives with minimum U.S. funding; and

(7) the desirability of developing a U.S. Pacific-Asian nuclear sharing nuclear assistance program within the general concept used in NATO. In light of the above considerations, no major strategic systems involving aircraft or missiles were considered.

b. In developing possible offers which could be made the following data was utilized:

(1) Delivery vehicles possessed by or programmed for country forces which can or could be modified to accept U.S.

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nuclear weapons: Japan - Nike-Hercules, F-104; India - Canberra (B-57), Australia - Canberra (B-57) F-111; New Zealand - Canberra (B-57); Philippines - F-5, Nike-Hercules; Republic of China - F-100, F-104G, F-5, Nike-Hercules; Pakistan - Canberra (B-57), F-5; Thailand - F-5; Republic of Korea - F-5; Nike-Hercules. (See attached tables for further details, Atch 1).

(2) Delivery vehicles being phased out of the U.S. inventory which could be provided under either Military Grant Aid or Sales: F-100, B-47, F-102.

(3) Nuclear weapons available in the U.S. stockpile appropriate to the mission and deliverable by available vehicles: MK-28 Bomb, MK-43 Bomb, MK-57 Bomb, MK-31 Warhead for Nike, MK-54 Warhead for Falcon (available yields and delivery vehicle compatibility shown in attached table, Atch 2).

(4) Low yield tactical nuclear weapons which could be developed for both U.S. and friendly nation use - these yield ranges to close gap between largest conventional and smallest nuclear yield now available.

(5) Nuclear weapons delivery training by U.S. personnel to insure that military units in potential recipient countries would be capable of delivering weapons on targets immediately upon receipt. This training to be offered in the United States during any transition courses scheduled for foreign pilots (such as the F-5 training at Williams AFB). In-country training to be offered by mobile U.S. training teams: this training to include a U.S. evaluation of foreign forces readiness and capability.

(6) Dummy weapons shapes to be provided country Air Forces to support indigenous continuation training in-country and an aggressive exercise program.

(7) Release of weapons effects data and any appropriate target materials to support SEATO/national military planning. Possible prior combined military planning and specific target assignment. Possible area exercises either with U.S. forces or multilateral including other area countries. TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

c. The following nuclear weapons storage possibilities were considered:

(1) Storage of tactical nuclear weapons in current U.S. storage facilities located in the countries involved with delivery to foreign forces only after commencement of hostilities, request by country and approval by the U.S. President.

(2) Storage and maintenance in-country in new U.S. sites under U.S. control colocated with country nuclear delivery forces particularly as regards air defense warheads.

(3) Possible use of NATO formula with Permissive Action Link (PAL) to provide certain national forces with a quick reaction alert (QRA), in the same time frame as the Chicom development of a nuclear capability.

d. The following politico-military factors were considered in the development of individual country analysis:

(1) Political feasibility in the short term in light of existing public opposition as it affects national leadership, changing evaluations of need by national leaders as a result of Chicom nuclear weapons progress.

(2) Political feasibility in the longer term considering basic stability of the nation and national leadership and the elements assuring firm long-term alliance with the U.S.

(3) Balance of power in the region as it would be affected by timing and scope of U.S. nuclear assistance offers and programs.

(4) National technical and military capabilities to effectively operate and maintain the delivery system to be offered.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

(5) National ability to support the cost of the program offered as compared to increased military assistance costs to the U.S. in providing required delivery systems and weapons.

(6) The nature and scope of the probable Chicom nuclear and conventional threat to the country in the next decade.

(7) The nature of possible other regional conflicts that could occur and could generate national requests for nuclear weapons to be utilized by their forces.

(8) Requirement to amend U.S. stockpile program and to develop new low-yield tactical weapons with related costs.

(9) Requirement to accomplish U.S. political objectives by types and time-phasing of offers to do the least possible damage to the current U.S. policy against nuclear proliferation.

(10) Responsiveness and availability of adequate U.S. command and control arrangements to support any in-country storage.

3. NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT CAPABILITY OF PACIFIC-ASIAN COUNTRIES (SOURCE: NIE 4-2-64)

a. Countries with a significant potential for developing nuclear weapons in this decade are:

(1) India — with the facilities it now has, could produce and test a nuclear device in one to three years after a decision to do so. India could produce by 1970 about a dozen weapons in the 20 KT range. Thereafter when reactor capacity is expected to increase substantially, India's ability to produce fissionable material will increase proportionately.

India's nuclear program has been carried out in such a way as to allow the Government — if it so decides — to move into a modest weapons program with little delay and moderate expense. India's decision as to whether to start a

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

nuclear weapons program will depend on its evaluation of a number of domestic and foreign factors including the scope and pace of the Chinese program, any changes in Sino-Soviet relations, and outside assurances. The chances are better than even that India will decide to develop nuclear weapons within the next few years.

(2) Japan - has an advanced nuclear research and power program and theoretically could produce nuclear weapons by the end of this decade if it desired. However, Japan does not have sufficient uranium for a weapons program and a major problem would be to locate sources of uranium free of safeguards. A program to produce a few nuclear weapons by 1970 could be carried out without major increases in the anticipated level of annual expenditures, by diversion of funds from projects now planned.

Some Japanese military leaders apparently now favor possession of nuclear weapons. Elements of the political leadership see the need and can be expected to become more vocal in support of acquiring nuclear weapons. If, after Communist China, India should develop or obtain nuclear weapons, the feeling may grow rapidly in Japan that it too, as a major Asian power, must have a nuclear capability.

b. Countries with the raw materials and technical skills available to initiate a weapons program in the next decade are:

(1) Australia - has well developed uranium production facilities, but no plans for construction of reactors which could produce significant amounts of plutonium.

c. Countries with minimal or no potential for developing a weapons program in this decade include:

(1) Those countries that should be considered for possible assistance because they have military forces that are capable of utilizing reasonably sophisticated equipment. Included

TOP SECRET

are Republic of China, New Zealand, Korea, Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan.

(2) Those countries that should not be considered for possible assistance because they lack the proper skill potential or are politically unacceptable at this time. Included are: Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, Afghanistan, Nepal, and Ceylon.

4. CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION:

a. Despite emotional political attitudes opposed to nuclear weaponry in Japan and India (the two countries most capable of national nuclear weapons programs), the impact of the Chinese Communist Nuclear Explosion (CCNE) has brought out perceptible desires for nuclear weapons in elements of the national leadership. Subsequent Chicom progress in nuclear testing and weapons development is very likely to have significant additional political impact in the Far East. RAND has estimated that the Chinese Communists are capable of producing a yield in the megaton range and are strongly motivated to do so "as soon as possible - if for no other reason than the propaganda value involved."* If this is done, it certainly would accelerate these conditions.

*RM-4356-PR, Nov 64

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b. The U.S. reassurance of our protection in the face of Chicom nuclear threats is not necessarily going to result in freeing our friends and allies from feeling strongly that some national capability must be developed. Some form of U.S. offer of nuclear assistance provides our primary avenue to assure that nuclear proliferation does not take place completely outside of our guidance and influence. Specific preparations should be made to prepare and program for possible U.S. offers to use at appropriate times.

d. Offers of nuclear assistance to Pacific-Asian countries are fraught with other problems as the effect of U.S. action would imbalance other balance-of-power relationships in the region. Probably the most significant of these problems is the India-Pakistan relationship where U.S. military aid to India is viewed with increasing sensitivity and bitterness by Pakistan, our SEATO partner. An additional example is posed by an offer to India and Japan which could produce weapons without any comparable offer to our SEATO and ANZUS partners. Because of these problems, possible nuclear assistance offers to all friendly and allied countries in the area have been examined. Just what defense commitments does the United States have in the area must be considered in making offers of nuclear assistance which are obviously keyed to the Chinese Communist threat. Under the SEATO treaty there are commitments to the following Pacific-Asian countries: Thailand, Pakistan, Australia, and New Zealand

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(Since France is also a SEATO member, she may also make some nuclear assistance offer within the SEATO context, even if token, to enhance her influence in the area). The U.S. has separate commitments to Australia and New Zealand under the ANZUS Pact. There are firm U.S. commitments under bi-lateral mutual security treaties with Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and the Republic of China. Offers made within these present commitments, which are all primarily directed against the Chinese Communist threat and based on mutual defensive action, can provide a concrete demonstration of U.S. firmness and intention. Providing threatened countries with their own direct nuclear counter to the developing Chicom military nuclear challenge can assure that our mutual defense arrangements do not falter and can be a significant deterrent to any contemplated direct Chicom aggression. Such nuclear-sharing arrangements can provide the U.S. President with the option to authorize allied delivery of low yield tactical nuclear weapons against any attempted direct aggression. Such action could be handled in a way to lessen the possibility of a direct US-USSR confrontation while effectively meeting our mutual defense commitments.

d. Another facet of a U.S. offer of nuclear assistance, even one beginning on a low key, is that Pacific-Asian countries would know that the U.S. policy on non-proliferation does not close door to nuclear sharing and that countries could make requests for assistance and get a serious hearing. All this would occur, we hope, before nations embarked on independent nuclear weapons development programs without U.S. control and influence.

5. COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY ANALYSIS:

a. Countries capable of independent nuclear weapons development:

(1) Japan: The U.S. has a firm security treaty with Japan which can be terminated by Japan in 1970. Public resistance to nuclear weapons is very strong in Japan and is continually stirred up by the powerful Japanese Socialist Party. However,

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certain leadership elements, including the newly elected Premier Sato, see a need for nuclear weapons. In this light, the next year seems to provide an opportunity to make an initial limited offer to Japan.

The Japanese Constitution has been construed as not precluding Japan from exercising the right of self-defense and maintaining forces to protect itself from aggression. Under this interpretation certain nuclear assistance offers are feasible, particularly if limited to obviously defensive weapons at first. Japan could be offered nuclear war heads for her Nike-Hercules missiles. The U.S. could renew the offer of F-102s

(making the renewed offer under the Military Aid Program, rather than sales), and offer to provide the nuclear missile and war-head. The offer should include provision for in-country storage under U.S. inspection, maintenance and control. Control provisions should be carefully established to insure a credible air defense reaction time. If not, consideration should be given to providing the air defense war heads without requiring Presidential approval but retaining U.S. possession, maintenance, and inspection to preclude any possibility of conversion to unintended use. In this case the bi-lateral agreement should provide for detailed agreement on use. This could stipulate that the Commander, 5th Air Force establish Air Defense Warning Red as a prerequisite

TOP SECRET

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to use. Such an offer would significantly enhance the capability for air defense of Japan, particularly in light of the programmed BADGE system. Once this nuclear assistance has been effected and Japanese public opinion has the time to assimilate and accept the presence of these weapons, Japan could be approached with a follow-on offer of F-104 modification to accommodate low yield nuclear weapons: the weapons to be stored in-country under U.S. control. This offer could, also, be considered within the current Constitution due to the limited range of the F-104. The force would provide Japan a significant capability against invading naval and ground forces (Chicom or USSR).

Further offers to Japan are not recommended within the time frame of this study which is intended to pace along with the initial Chicom nuclear weapons capability.

(2) India: India has the capability to produce nuclear weapons in the near future. Politically the mass public resistance to nuclear weapons does not exist as it does in Japan. The opposition has come about as a result of Congress Party leadership. As a result of the CCNE, elements of this leadership are changing their mind and coming to realize a need for an Indian nuclear capability.

TOP SECRET

10

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However, the next major event in developing Chicom nuclear capability could easily bring Congress Party leadership over to accepting a firm need for Indian nuclear weapons. Acceptance by Congress Party leadership would be tantamount to public acceptance. The primary objective of a U.S. nuclear assistance offer to India would be to preclude an independent national nuclear development program, Nuclear assistance offered would be tied to provision of a capability against the Chicom and Soviet threat, and precluding development of an Indian nuclear threat toward Pakistan. Any offer of nuclear assistance to India is going to have to be balanced by a parallel offer to Pakistan. Because of the complicated factors in this situation, the fact that the U.S. initial intention is to avert Indian desires or plans for independent nuclear development, and our desire to retain some degree of control and influence on further nuclear proliferation, the initial U.S. offer of nuclear assistance to India should be low key. The U.S. can offer certain types and yields of nuclear weapons for delivery in Indian Canberra's (B-57). The offer would include sufficient support to insure the Indian Canberra unit is immediately able to respond: Canberra modification as required, aircrew delivery training, training dummy weapons, weapons effects data for planning and necessary target data to support the feasibility and desirability of weapon use.

Storage facilities in India would be necessary, but the desirability of maintaining any stockpile in-place - there and in Pakistan - requires further consideration. Training in maintenance and loading, Joint USAF/IAF Teams, exchange of personnel, etc., are feasible and should be encouraged. The offer would provide India, at little cost, as much nuclear capability as she could

TOP SECRET

achieve in the near future without significant expenditure of her own resources. It would provide weapons for the major threat and would avoid providing an Indian capability to use nuclear weapons in any conflict with Pakistan that arose. No follow-on offer to India is indicated unless necessitated by subsequent events such as the phase out of Indian Canberras. If our offer is made before India has proceeded too far down the road with purchase of Soviet MIGs or production of the HF-24, it could be indicated that reconsideration of a suitable delivery vehicle could provide a high capability follow-on delivery system to supplant the Canberra.

(3) Australia: Our close relationship with Australia has been formalized in the defense area by common membership in SEATO and even more so, by the ANZUS Pact.

Although Australia could not develop an independent national nuclear capability in the near future, she has the necessary raw material and the technical skills. If the U.S. is to make any offers of nuclear assistance to India or Japan which could quickly get into an independent national nuclear development program, some comparable offer should be made to Australia because of the long-term importance of maintaining our close ties. On the other hand, the initial public offer should not be significantly greater in scope to avoid the accusation by other Pacific-Asian countries that the only "white" nation in the area is receiving vastly preferred treatment. Since Australia is programmed to receive the F-111, it seems that an initial offer similar to that proposed for India could be made effectively. The details of the offer would be the same but the possession of the F-111 would, in fact, give Australia a markedly greater capability. Tactical weapons and target data offered should be keyed to agreed SEATO and ANZUS objectives.

b. Other countries (minimal or negative potential for independent nuclear development)

TOP SECRET

aland. Like Australia, New Zealand has firm, long-term ties to the U.S. It is our partner in both SEATO and ANZUS. Although she has no potential of an independent national nuclear program, it seems most appropriate to make an offer of nuclear assistance somewhat similar to any offer to Australia. New Zealand possesses the Canberra (B-57) and has been considering procurement a limited number of F-4/F-5 as a replacement strike aircraft. With these nuclear-capable delivery systems, the initial offer proposed for Australia can be made to New Zealand.

(b) Philippines: This country is "a key element in the strategic military planning of the United States."* Maintenance of our base and forces structure there is essential to the U.S. military posture in the region. At the time that any limited nuclear assistance is offered to countries in the Pacific-Asian area, an offer to the Philippines would have to be considered as they are very sensitive to signs of waning American interest.** In addition to our SEATO connection, a mutual defense treaty exists between the U.S. and the Philippines. Since two (2) squadrons of the F-5 are programmed into the Philippine Air Force within the next several years, a potential nuclear delivery system will be available in-country. Modification of the F-5 will be necessary to accept nuclear weapons. Another facet of the Philippine situation is the fact that the U.S. does store nuclear weapons there under the tacit approval of the Philippine Government. A limited offer of U.S. nuclear assistance can be made by providing the F-5 modification and nuclear delivery training with a formula for provision of low yield tactical weapons from in-country present U.S. storage sites during combat operations as mutually agreed. The initial offer can be made either within the SEATO framework or under the bi-lateral

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

mutual defense treaty.

(c) Pakistan: As stated above, Pakistan has exhibited extreme sensitivity to U.S. military aid to India. Because of Pakistan's problems with India, any U.S. offer of nuclear assistance to India must consider a parallel offer to Pakistan. In addition, any U.S. offer of nuclear assistance in the SEATO framework would include Pakistan. Use of SEATO as the vehicle could help, considering President Ayub's recent statement that Pakistan joined only as a cooperative gesture to the U.S. These aspects tend to indicate equal limited offers by the U.S. to all of our allies in the area: offers calculated not to result in any significant unbalancing of power relationships except as regards Communist China. Turning back to Pakistan itself, she possesses (like India) a nuclear capable force with the B-57. Like the Philippines, Pakistan is scheduled to receive the F-5 which could be modified for nuclear delivery. An initial offer to Pakistan can be based on offers of training in nuclear delivery for its forces with a formula for provision of low yield tactical weapons during combat operations. The in-country storage aspect of the offer should be parallel to that offered India. Training should be on a b scale. The offer should include combined exercises with US Strike Command units on a regular schedule. Such training would not only assist in assuring force readiness, but should also have beneficial political side effects in deterring China and shoring up the US-Pakistan relationship.

TOP SECRET

(d) Thailand: The ability of the United States to respond effectively within Southeast Asia depends to a great extent on our access to Thai bases and facilities. Currently our access is based upon informal agreements. Thailand is one of the Southeast Asian countries most likely to be affected by Chicom nuclear blackmail as a part of the Chicom threat in that area. Thai forces are scheduled to receive the F-5 thus could be made a nuclear assistance offer similar to that proposed for Pakistan.

(2) Bi-lateral Mutual Defense/Security Treaty Countries

(a) Korea. Even though not a member of any multilateral security organization, Korea has significant defense ties with the U.S. as a result of the Korean conflict, the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty, and the large element of U.S. forces based there. Korea is very subject to Chicom nuclear blackmail. Like Thailand, Korea is due to receive the F-5 which can be modified for nuclear delivery. However, the situation is somewhat different as U.S. nuclear weapons are present and the U.S. Air Force is already standing quick reaction nuclear alert in Korea. But still, it could be to the U.S. advantage if Korean forces were able to deliver tactical nuclear weapons during any resumption of Korean hostilities. A limited nuclear offer, similar to any that are proposed for others could be a basis for allaying present concerns with lack of conventional modernization and possible conventional force reductions as a result of declining MAP budgets. An additional step is possible in Korea as they are

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programmed for the Nike-Hercules. If an offer of nuclear war heads for these air defense weapons is made Japan, a similar offer should be made Korea. This would provide a significant increase in air defense capabilities since Korea is faced with the initial Chicom air-breathing nuclear threat. This could also justify consideration of including Korean F-5s in our quick reaction alert posture there.

(b) Republic of China. As with Korea, China

has only a mutual defense treaty with the United States. The governmental problem in the long-term is somewhat similar to the situation existing in Korea. Developing Chicom nuclear capabilities will have a profound effect the GRC leadership element. A limited nuclear offer would have the effect of shoring up this leadership. In the event of a significant Chicom military effort against Taiwan, it could also be to the U.S. advantage to have the ChiNat forces deliver any tactical nuclear weapons which might be required to meet the situation. Also, as in Korea, they are faced with the immediate threat of a Chicom air-breathing nuclear threat. Being programmed for Nike-Hercules, the offer of nuclear war heads under U.S. control could provide a significant counter to the Chicom initial threat. In the strike role, it should be mentioned that in June 1958 the JCS approved a Low Altitude Bombing System (LABS) capability for the Chinese Nationalist Air Force (CNAF) and that LABS equipped F-100F aircraft were delivered. Therefore, a basic capability exists now for rapid completion of a nuclear agreement. The ChiNats also possess the F-104G and are scheduled to receive the F-5. In addition the U.S. already maintains nuclear weapons and an F-100 quick reaction alert cell at Tainan Air Base. The CNAF is capable of moving rapidly to a nuclear delivery capability in response to the Chicom threat. They should be considered for rapid implementation of a nuclear assistance program with in-country storage of weapons: a program which should be aimed at providing ChiNat forces in a quick reaction alert posture as the Chicom military nuclear threat comes into being. Located close to Okinawa, a combined training exercise program could be developed with the F-105 Wing there similar to the airborne exercise program which has been in off for several years.

TOP SECRET

(c) Other Countries: No other countries in the area were considered due to the following factors:

- (1) No potential for a national nuclear program.
- (2) No formal defense commitments by the U.S.
- (3) No systems capable of nuclear delivery either possessed or programmed for their forces.

6. CONCLUSIONS

a. Some program of positive action will be necessary if the U.S. is to avert development of independent national nuclear weapons programs in Japan and India. If the U.S. is to maintain influence and control over the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the next decade, some slight opening of the door to U.S. nuclear power and knowledge is indicated. Release should be based on the minimum program which will avert the desire of capable nations to initiate independent programs, will support U.S. defense commitments in the area, and will not upset U.S. and local power relationships in the area. The program would not add significantly to present U.S. atomic strength to respond to Communist China but would add greatly to the credibility of the U.S. commitment and firmness of U.S. intentions.

b. In terms of side effects, a limited program providing friendly countries the capability of responding to Chicom direct aggression will provide the U.S. President with the option of allowing the controlled use of nuclear weapons. This could be the only immediate response required to stop aggression. It could assist in avoiding a direct confrontation between the U.S. and the USSR in a Far East regional conflict. It could be the only form of U.S. assistance necessary to meet its defense commitments and avoid the necessity of involving significant elements of conventional U.S. forces.

c. Initiation of a nuclear assistance program only for the countries which could achieve an independent capability in the near future (Japan and India) would result in significant adverse reactions by other U.S. allies in the area. To avert these reactions

TOP SECRET

a limited nuclear assistance program should be prepared to offer selected U.S. allies in the area. Except for India, only those countries which have firm defense links with the U.S. through ANZUS, SEATO or bi-lateral security pacts should be included.

d. Nuclear assistance should only be provided in furtherance of plans and objectives which the U.S. is already committed to support (except in the case of India where the primary objective is to avoid an independent national program).

e. There are three specific areas of considerable potential value which are subject to great flexibility in exploitation that warrant careful study:

(1) First, the construction of secure storage facilities, the provision of custodial detachments and the degree to which these facilities are in active use, would convey strong messages to our allies. The exploitation of storage arrangements should be carefully studied to provide for the most desirable impact -- political and military -- in each instance. For example, in Australia and on Taiwan we would want to have in being -- or in the case of Taiwan, perhaps expanded -- storage capability with weapons in some limited quantity actually available; in Pakistan and India we would want the facilities and very limited custodial personnel but it probably would be preferable not to provide for storage in-country except in response to a situation of imminent operations.

(2) Training activity offers tremendous possibilities. Operational proficiency of country forces could be maintained through some close association with US air forces deployed in the area. Training and delivery techniques, combined exercises, competitive activity, even some sort of "buddy" relationship between units could be exploited well to demonstrate an intimacy of relationships and sharing of vital tasks that would go far in achieving important political objectives.

(3) Finally, alert postures, such as PACAF's "Quick Strike" alert in Korea, on Taiwan, and, perhaps, even in the Philippines, might in some measure be shared with host country forces. Again, this degree of integration of effort and demonstrated reliance on Allies for the accomplishment of vital operational tasks should have useful impact. Appropriate controls and limitations would, of course, have to be exercised with particular care in selecting foreign crews, in allocating targets and in the exercise of launch control. In terms of proficiency, however, there should be little problem in establishing effective crews certainly in the CNAF, probably in the ROKAF, and possibly in the Philippine Air Force.

f. The use of delivery systems already in or programmed for friendly forces enables the US to keep costs down and provides dual-capable systems. An important consideration in timing is the fact that an F-5 modification program would require 24 months. The use of standard tactical nuclear weapons keeps nuclear material and production costs down and enables necessary stockpile adjustments to be accomplished over a longer period, thus also keeping costs down. Numbers and yields of weapons offered should either be left vague or limited to the minimum potentially required. Commitments of specific types and numbers should be avoided, where possible, to avoid severe impact on U.S. stockpile planning and weapon production requirements. The MK 57 Bomb, having a selection of low yields, seems to be the best type to offer.